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The role of township-owned enterprises in the rapid growth of the Chinese econ-
omy during reform is widely acknowledged. Beginning in the mid-1990s, how-
ever, these ﬁrms began to be privatized. Perhaps the most striking feature of
this process is that it has not occurred uniformly across townships. This raises
the simple question: When and why do government leaders privatize? Drawing
on a unique data set we collected in the summers of 1998 and 2000, this paper
provides a simple theoretical and empirical investigation into this question. We
focus on the eﬀect of bank liquidity and bank objectives in determining the
value of the ﬁrm in the event of privatization. We consider how bank decisions
interact with those of governmental leaders and ﬁrm managers and ultimately
determine the attractiveness of privatization. We also analyze the conditions
under which shutdown might be preferred to privatization as a method to divest
of government-owned ﬁrms. We ﬁnd that this simple model of the privatization
decision yields insights which can be tested with this unique data set.
Geographic Area: China
Keywords: Privatization, Township and Village Enterprises, Financial Institu-
tions.1 Introduction
Since the early 1980s, privatization has become a widely-used strategy for ad-
dressing problems in state-owned enterprises. Its use has not been limited to
ﬁrms in the former socialist countries, but extends to state-owned ﬁrms that
were established in the post-WW II period in predominantly market economies
as well. Megginson and Netter (2001), in a recent survey of privatization stud-
ies, point out that the goals in both cases appear to be fairly similar. They
i n c l u d et h ed e s i r et oi n c r e a s ee n t e r p r i s ee ﬃciency through improvements in cor-
porate governance; the need to reduce government subsidies and raise ﬁscal
revenue; and the desire to limit government interference in the economy. Al-
though considerable attention has been given in the literature to diﬀerences in
how ﬁrms have been privatized—primarily because of the implications for ﬁrms’
post-privatization governance and performance—no work has been done explain-
ing diﬀerences across countries in the use of privatization.
In China, privatization has been generally avoided as a policy tool for dealing
with the ailing state enterprise sector. State sector privatization has been limited
to smaller state-owned ﬁrms, and then only in the last few years (Cao et al., 1999;
Lin and Zhu, 2001). In contrast, since the mid-1990s, there has been a massive
privatization of ﬁrms owned and managed by lower levels of government, namely,
China’s township and village enterprises (TVEs).1 Ag r o w i n gn u m b e ro fl o c a l
governments have also shut down their ﬁrms. Ironically, these same ﬁrms are
credited with having been the most dynamic segment of the Chinese economy
since reform, and a major source of economic growth (Che and Qian, 1998;
Oi, 1999; Chen and Rozelle, 1999). Perhaps the most striking feature of this
process is that it has not occurred uniformly; instead, we observe considerable
1In Chinese, these ﬁrms are oﬃcially referred to as jiti qiye or collectively-owned ﬁrms, but
were largely owned and controlled by local governments.
1heterogeneity across China.
Our objective in this paper is to provide an explanation for the diﬀerences
we observe in privatization behavior. Our basic premise is that governments and
politicians derive a variety of economic, social, and political beneﬁts from the
control over enterprises that comes with ownership. The size of these beneﬁts,
however, is not determined in isolation, but rather depends on the rest of the
economic environment, including, for example, the choices of enterprise man-
agers and the nature of local ﬁnancial institutions. We argue that diﬀerences
across localities in these institutions aﬀect the private and public returns to
government ownership, and thus the incentives of governments and politicians
to privatize ﬁrms.
Formally, we develop a simple environment to analyze how the privatization
decision is aﬀected by the interactions of three key players: the government, a
bank, and a ﬁrm manager/owner. Our model links the government’s privatiza-
tion decision to their ability to extract perks through ownership, the hardness of
the the ﬁrm’s budget constraints, the human capital of enterprise managers, ﬁrm
monitoring costs, and the incentives and constraints of the banks. These factors
ultimately imply how the value of the ﬁrm varies with ownership. Although pri-
vatization can be beneﬁcial to a government since it eliminates the agency cost
inherent in government ownership, it also implies a loss of political capital or
perks by the leader. In essence, the decision to privatize is a weighing of these
costs and beneﬁts. Theoretically, we ﬁnd that privatization is more likely when
perks to the government from owning ﬁrms are smaller, when leaders have low
human capital, and when managers have high human capital. We also ﬁnd that
some factors have an ambiguous eﬀect on privatization, including the hardness
of the ﬁrm’s budget, the bank’s concern about proﬁts, the bank manager’s hu-
2man capital, and the costs associated with bank illiquidity. However, when the
budget is much harder for privately-owned than for government-owned ﬁrms,
these factors have unambiguously positive eﬀects on privatization.
The model also allows us to study the shutdown behavior of government-
owned ﬁrms. Shutdown is appealing for a leader when the ﬁrm is of a negative
value if retained as government-owned, and when the leader is unable to sell it
to the manager for a positive price. Thus, shutdown is less likely when either
the value of a government-owned ﬁrm or that of a private ﬁrm increases.
In the empirical part of the paper, drawing on a unique data set on town-
ship governments, ﬁrms and local ﬁnancial institutions we collected in 1998
and 2000, we test hypotheses generated from the theoretical model and explain
the heterogeneity of privatization and shutdown patterns across townships. We
ﬁrst employ a Probit model to identify factors aﬀecting the probability of pri-
vatization. To capture diﬀerences in the timing of privatization and deal with
the censoring of the data, we also estimate a Cox Hazard Rate function. Re-
sults from both the Probit model and the Hazard model support our theoretical
predictions: Privatization is more likely when leaders have low human capital,
when it is diﬃcult for leaders to extract perks from government-owned ﬁrms,
when bank managers have high human capital, and when bank managers have
good incentives and are more liquidity constrained. Furthermore, we ﬁnd that
when the government-owned ﬁrm’s budget is hard, some of the above eﬀects on
privatization become weaker. Finally, we apply a Multinomial Probit model to
study ﬁrm’s shutdown behavior. Results of these regressions also support our
theoretical predictions on shutdown.
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides
background information on township ﬁrms and the privatization movement in
3rural China. Section 3 sets up the theoretical model. Section 4 solves the
model and conducts comparative statics on factors aﬀecting privatization and
shutdown. Section 5 extends the theoretical model to allow for banks to make
decisions on loan size. Section 6 describes the survey and data. Section 7
presents the empirical model and regression results. Section 8 concludes.
2 Background: Local Governments, Firms, and
Financial Institutions
The township represents the lowest level of government in the state adminis-
trative hierarchy in China.2 A typical township has a population of 50,000,
ﬁfteen to twenty percent of which reside in the township center, and the rest
in outlying villages. Township leadership is made up of the township party-
secretary (xiang shuji), the township head (xiang zhang), and the director of
the township enterprise committee, all of whom are appointed by higher-level
party/government authorities. In some townships, the party secretary or the
township head simultaneously hold the position of director of the township en-
terprise committee. Leaders tend to rotate positions every three years or so
on average, but there are considerable diﬀerences in leader tenure. Township
leaders are evaluated on the basis of their ability to fulﬁll targets set by higher
level authorities. The most important of these targets relate to family planning,
tax remission, and economic development, especially the development of local
enterprises. Bonuses and career prospects are tied to fulﬁlling these targets (Oi,
1999; Whiting, 2000). Revenue from township-owned ﬁrms has been central
to ﬁnancing a growing list of local expenditures mandated by higher levels of
government.
2Villages are below townships, but are not formal governmental units. They still perform,
however, some governmental functions. Altogether, there are more than 25,000 townships in
China.
4Through the ﬁrst decade and a half of economic reform in China, township
and village owned enterprises (TVEs) were the most dynamic sector of the econ-
omy (Che and Qian, 1998; Chen and Rozelle, 1999; Oi, 1999). Over this period,
real growth averaged more than twenty percent annually. By the early nineties,
these enterprises totaled more than 1.25 million in number, and employed 135.1
million, an increase of more than 100 million since 1980. At its peak, em-
ployment in these ﬁrms represented more than a third of total non-agricultural
employment in the economy, and nearly 75 percent of non-agricultural employ-
ment in the rural sector. These ﬁrms were also the source of more than a third
of the gross value of industrial output (GVIO), and a quarter of all exports.
There is an extensive literature debating the reasons for the growth and
success of these ﬁrms, which were government-owned and managed.3 The con-
trast with the performance of state-owned enterprises over the same period is
fairly stark.4 The emerging consensus is that it was a combination of histor-
ical legacy, e.g. the accumulation of human and physical capital under the
communes, better access to resources and inputs in an environment in which
input and product markets were imperfect, harder budget constraints, ﬁscal
imperatives, and leader incentives that gave these ﬁrms a critical institutional
advantage over other ownership forms during this period.
Throughout this period, China’s rural economy and local enterprises were
largely serviced by two ﬁnancial institutions, the Agricultural Bank of China
(ABC), and Rural Credit Cooperatives (RCC). Both institutions could be found
in most townships. Combined, they held nearly eighty percent of all rural de-
posits and were the source of an equal percentage of loans, nearly half of which
3See, for example, Byrd and Lin (1990), Che and Qian (1998), Oi (1999), Weitzman and
Xu (1994), and Whiting (2000).
4Estimates suggest that the rate of growth in SOEs was only about half of that in the
TVEs. Moreover, productivity growth in SOEs was only 1-2 percent annually, compared to 3
percent in TVEs. See Jeﬀerson and Rawski (1995).
5went to township and village enterprises (Park, Brandt, and Giles, 1997). The
ABC was one of four specialized state-owned banks and was responsible for lend-
ing to support agriculture and rural development. Oﬃcially, the RCCs were au-
tonomous, collective-run local institutions, but up through the early 1990s were
usually supervised by local ABC branches. In some cases, the same individual
managed the two institutions. However, in 1994 supervision of the RCCs shifted
to China’s central bank, The People’s Bank of China (PBC), and the separa-
tion between the RCCs and ABCs became more distinct. Branch managers
of both institutions were appointed by higher level branches, but throughout
much of this period, these decisions were heavily inﬂuenced by township level
governments.
2.1 Enterprise Privatization
In the early 1990s, China’s central government eﬀectively allowed local govern-
ments to begin to privatize ﬁrms as part of a nationwide program on enterprise
ownership restructuring, or zhuanzhi (Cao et al., 1999).5 Prior to then, priva-
tization was strictly prohibited. The goal of this policy was to redeﬁne the role
of government in the economy and better deﬁne property rights in the ﬁrm as
a way of promoting eﬃciency. Reform was not limited to privatizations, but
also included the conversion of local government-owned ﬁrms into joint stock or
shareholding companies in which the government held only partial ownership.
Reﬂecting the high degree of decentralization in China, each level of government
was eﬀectively given discretion as to how to interpret and carry out this policy.
Throughout much of the nineties, privatization at the township and village-level
went largely unnoticed inside and outside of China.
5These initiatives were related to the implementation of a new strategy for establishing a
modern enterprise system as spelled out in November of 1993 at the Third Plenum of the 14th
Party Congress.
6There are no national data on the ownership changes that occurred as part
of this policy initiative, but in the tables below we summarize data collected
by the authors that provide estimates at the township level for the two coastal
provinces of China, Jiangsu and Zhejiang.6 The data, in fact, are a census
of 643 township-owned ﬁrms (TEs) drawn from 15 counties and 57 townships
surveyed in these two provinces.7 On average, a township had 11 ﬁrms, with
the maximum (minimum) of 20 (2).8 For all of these ﬁrms, we have information
on any changes that occurred in ownership between 1993 and 1997, and the
year of the change. For 390 of these ﬁrms, we have additional information on
any changes in 1998 and 1999.9 These changes include outright privatization of
these ﬁrms, as well as conversions to joint-stock or shareholding companies.
In Table 1, we summarize information on the year in which townships began
to carry out ownership reform, and the expected year of completion. A total of
57 townships reported information on the year in which restructuring began, 51
of which also reported the year of completion. Implementation began in earnest
in 1993, with 11 townships starting that year. Half of all townships initiated
programs in either 1996 or 1997. There is a signiﬁcant provincial diﬀerence, with
townships in Zhejiang starting on average a year and a half earlier than those
in Jiangsu. From beginning to end, the length of time involved in the process
was slightly more than two years, with a majority of townships reporting being
c o m p l e t e di n1 9 9 8 .
Changes in ownership took several forms. In a majority of cases, it entailed
6For nationwide data on the restructuring of SOEs, see Lin and Zhu (2001).
7In some townships, township-owned ﬁrms were actually private ﬁrms that used the town-
ship designation for political reasons. In the survey, these ‘red-hat’ ﬁrms were classiﬁed from
the outset as private ﬁrms.
8To help put these ﬁrms in perspective, average employment in 1994 was 180 (median, 80),
output was 13.9 million RMB (median, 4.0), and total ﬁxed assets were 25.3 million RMB
(median, 4.4).
9These data were obtained in a supplemental survey carried out in May and June of 2000.
Administrative diﬃculties prevented us from updating information in all townships.
7selling the entire ﬁrm to either a single individual or a group of individuals.10 In
o t h e rc a s e s ,h o w e v e r ,o n l yp a r to ft h eﬁrm was sold, and the township retained
either a majority or minority position. This typically occurred as part of a
process of converting the company to a share-holding company. In still other
cases, share-holding companies were completely privatized with the sale of the
township’s remaining share. The survey also collected information on ﬁrms that
were shutdown, and ceased operations.
I nT a b l e2 ,w ep r e s e n ta n n u a li n f o r m a t i o no nt h en u m b e ra n dp e r c e n t a g eo f
ﬁrms that were aﬀected by these changes. We use as our deﬁnition of privati-
zation the sale of 100 percent of the ﬁrm.11 In calculating annual privatization
rates, we normalize by the number of collectively-owned ﬁrms that were in pro-
d u c t i o na tt h eb e g i n n i n go ft h ey e a r . I nt h et o ph a l fo ft h et a b l e ,w ep r e s e n t
information for those ﬁrms for which we have data up through 1997 and in
the bottom half report similar information for the smaller sample of ﬁrms in
townships for which we have information for the slightly longer period between
1993-1999. In 1997, for example, there were 438 ﬁrms in operation that were
classiﬁed as collectively-owned. Out of these ﬁrms, 73 (16.7%) were privatized,
13 (3.0%) were converted into share-holding companies in which the township
retained only a minority position, and an equal number were converted into
share-holding companies in which the township had a majority share. There
were also nine share-holding companies in which the township sold oﬀ their mi-
nority share, and thus became fully private. Finally, there were 41 (9.4%) ﬁrms
that were shutdown in that year. Table 3 provides a breakdown for the two
10In all but a few cases, the ﬁrm was sold to the incumbent manager.
11A broader deﬁnition of privatization would include as private those township ﬁrms that
were converted into joint-stock companies in which the township only retained a minority
position. Using this deﬁnition, the percentage of ﬁrms that were privatized between 1994
and 1997 increases from 34.2% to 45.1%. Our ability to explain diﬀerences in privatization
across townships using this broader measure of privatization is considerably weaker, suggesting
important diﬀerences between these kinds of ﬁrms.
8provinces drawing on the longer, but smaller survey.
Several features of the data are noteworthy. First, over the period between
1993 and 1999, privatization was pervasive. Altogether, 208 out of our sample
of 390 ﬁrms, or 53.3 percent of ﬁrms were fully privatized. This consists of 157
ﬁrms that were privatized through a single sale, plus 51 more ﬁrms that were ﬁrst
converted into shareholding companies in which the township retained equity,
and then became fully private when the township sold-oﬀ their remaining shares.
Second, there is a marked increase over time in the rate of privatization
activity, which peaked in 1998. This is true both in terms of the absolute number
of ﬁrms aﬀected, as well as in terms of the percentage of ﬁrms privatized. In 1996
and 1997, the rate of privatization was nearly double that experienced between
1993 and 1995. The rate again doubled in 1998, before declining signiﬁcantly
in 1999.
Third, although the diﬀerences across provinces are modest,12 there is con-
siderable heterogeneity across townships in privatization rates. In Table 4, we
report the cumulative distribution for the percentage of ﬁrms that were priva-
tized at the township level. We report these percentages for both samples, the
larger sample that runs up through 1997 and includes 57 townships, and the
smaller one that extends to 1999, but only covers 43 townships. The distri-
butions are similar, and suggest a fairly uniform distribution for privatization
rates at the township level.
And fourth, a signiﬁcant number of ﬁrms in the survey were shutdown. For
the sample running up through 1999, 68 out of 390, or slightly more than one-
s i x t ho ft h eﬁrms, went out of operations. For the sample running up through
1997, 99 ﬁrms, or 15.4 percent, were bankrupt. To put this into perspective, this
12In Jiangsu, 51.8 percent were privatized, while in Zhejiang the percentage is 57.0.
9is two times the number of ﬁrms in the same townships that went out of oper-
ations between 1980 and 1993.13 T h eh i g hr a t eo fs h u t d o w ne ﬀectively lowered
(raised) the percentage of government-controlled (private) ﬁrms in operation at
the end of the period.
3 The Model
In our model, a government’s decision to privatize a township-owned ﬁrm de-
pends on the ex-post value of the ﬁrm under the two alternative forms of own-
ership. If the value of the ﬁrm is higher if it is ran as a privatized ﬁrm, it
is sold; otherwise, it remains government owned.14 In either case, the value
of the ﬁrm depends on the combined behavior of the ﬁrm manager, the bank,
and the government leader. In order to solve for this privatization decision, we
must consider the value of the ﬁrm under each of these ownership structures. If
the ﬁrm is not proﬁtable under either ownership structure, the government will
choose to shut it down.
We consider a simple two period game. At the outset, a township government
owns an enterprise, and is therefore actively involved in its management.15 The
ﬁrm is deﬁned in terms of a project that requires outside (bank) funding to
ﬁnance. In period one, the leader faces the problem of deciding whether to
remain active in the management of the ﬁr m ,t os e l li tt oam a n a g e r ,o rt os h u t
it down. If the ﬁrm ceases operating, the game ends. In the second period,
once the privatization decision has been made, the bank and the current owner
13Information on ﬁrm shutdown prior to 1993 in these locality was obtained in the supple-
mentary survey.
14N o t eh o w e v e rt h i si so n l ya ne ﬃcient allocation in a weak sense, since the agents’ respective
valuations are a function of the eﬀort levels chosen. However, these choices may not be optimal.
For example, agents do not internalize all of the costs associated with default.
15We use the leader as the representative of the government, and use the two words, leader
and government, interchangeably throughout the rest of the paper.
10simultaneously choose how much eﬀort to exert in the project.16
Bank eﬀort can be interpreted either as monitoring eﬀort or as ﬁnancial and
productive expertise that directly improves the probability of the ﬁrm’s success.
If the ﬁrm is township owned, the leader needs to decide how much eﬀort to
induce from the manager. If the ﬁrm is privatized, the manager must decide his
own eﬀort level. After these costly eﬀorts are undertaken, the proﬁtability of
the project is realized, determining the value of the ﬁrm.
In Section 7, we extend our model to allow the loan (or project) size to be
endogenously chosen by the bank as well. This extension does not qualitatively
change the model’s predictions.
Both the government-owned ﬁrm and the private ﬁrm have limited liability.
When or if the project fails, the leader (manager) needs only to pay the bank
the ﬁrm’s total production and any other predetermined collateral.17
We initially take the bank loan as given, and assume that the ﬁrm has a
project that requires a ﬁxed amount of capital K to implement.18 T h er a t eo f
interest R is also taken as given.19 We assume that neither the leader nor the
ﬁrm manager has the capacity to self ﬁnance.20
We assume that the bank provides loans and makes its monitoring decisions
to maximize an objective function that includes bank proﬁtability, costs of illiq-
16We make these decisions simultaneous. First, it seems plausible that eﬀort decisions could
be adjusted easily. And secondly, the simultaneous nature of play implies that the manager
o rl e a d e rc a n n o tc o m m i tt ot h e i re ﬀort levels. It is this lack of commitment on the part of
the manager of a newly privatized ﬁrm which seems like a central feature that needs to be
captured.
17We assume that the legal framework, including bankruptcy laws and the bank’s capacity
to collect on bad debt, is taken as given by the players.
18Or equivalently, that continued production requires a minimal operating loan of K.
19This assumption reﬂects the fact that interest rates are ﬁxed by the government.
20Although such operating loans have often been diﬃcult for private ﬁrms to acquire, we
take the loan as given for now and return to the question of loan size later. Of course, the
capacity to receive external ﬁnance will be a crucial feature in determining the value of a ﬁrm
t oam a n a g e r .
11uidity, and perks associated with relationships with township-owned enterprises.21
The technology of the project is assumed to take on the following simple
structure: An investment K can either generate a successful gross revenue of
SK (where S>1) or nothing.22 The project’s probability of success P depends
on the eﬀort levels of the bank and the ﬁrm manager P(aB,a F). We assume
that this probability has the following properties: P1 = ∂P





< 0, P22 = ∂2P
∂a2
F
< 0, P12 = ∂2P
∂aB∂aF > 0, P11P22 − P2
12 > 0,
P112 = ∂3P
∂aB∂2aF < 0, and P122 = ∂3P
∂aB∂2aL < 0. These imply that the probabil-
ity of success increases in both eﬀort levels but at a decreasing rate. Moreover,
these eﬀorts are complementary, but this complementarity diminishes. We also
assume P satisﬁes the following initial conditions: P(0,0) = 0, P(0,+) > 0,
P(+,0) > 0, P12(0,+) = P12(+,0) = ∞ and P12(∞,+) = P12(+,∞)=0 . 23
These assumptions mean that neither the ﬁrm’s nor the bank’s eﬀort are abso-
lutely critical, but the project will fail without eﬀo r tf r o ma tl e a s to n eo ft h e m .
Also, the complementarity is extremely strong when one of their eﬀorts is low
and weakens when one of the eﬀorts is very high.
Beyond the revenue from such a sale, the primary advantage to the leader
of selling the ﬁrm is that it saves the leader the costs associated with inducing
managerial eﬀort. However, aside from sacriﬁcing a claim to the ﬁrm’s proﬁts,
selling the ﬁrm also has the drawback of diminishing the perks (or political
capital) of the leader.24 We assume that the township leader maximizes the
21There are many reasons that banks may provide loans to private ﬁrms. They may be
interested in proﬁts. They may also provide loans to private ﬁrms with the intention of
using the proﬁts generated to maintain their valuable relationships with TEs. In this way, the
decision to loan to private ﬁrms is not motivated by a decreased interest in the TE sector (αB),
or even necessarily an increased interest in proﬁt( β), but rather by a continued commitment
to investment in TEs.
22This structure could be enriched without qualitatively aﬀecting the results.
23These assumptions guarantee that there is a unique solution to the game.
24These perks associated with township ownership can be interpreted in many ways. Cyn-
ically, they can be viewed as private beneﬁts derived from the de facto control of ﬁrm assets
by the leader. More optimistically, they can be viewed as political capital obtained from
12following objective function of revenue and perks minus costs if the ﬁrm is
township owned:
UL = αLK + P(aB,a F)(S − R)K − δL(1 − P(aB,a F))K − CL(aF,φL). (1)
αLK is the perk the leader associates with a project or ﬁrm of size K,25 (S−R)K
is the proﬁt from a successful project, and δLK is the collateral that must be
paid if it fails. We use δL to represent the softness of the budget. If the budget
is hard, δL = 1, the leader is fully responsible for the debt and interest, i.e. must
provide collateral having the same value as the investment. If δL = 0, then the
leader incurs no cost in the event of a failure. In reality, one would imagine that
δL lies between 0 and 1.26 If the ﬁrm is privatized, the leader is paid a price p
for the ﬁrm determined by Nash bargaining and incurs no costs.
The leader’s cost function CL(aF,φL) captures in a simple reduced form way
the cost to the leader of inducing a level of eﬀort aF from the ﬁrm manager.27
This cost captures both the compensation for the disutility of eﬀort experienced
by the manager and the monitoring costs and incentives required to induce the
desired level of eﬀort. φL is the level of human capital of the leader. This variable
captures how easily or cheaply the leader can monitor and induce eﬀort. This
variable can also capture the outside opportunities of the manager; when these
opportunities are high it is costly to induce eﬀort (low φL). We assume that this
cost function has the following properties: CL
1 = ∂CL





guaranteeing employment and promoting economic activity in the township. See Shliefer and
Vishny (1994), Boyco et al. (1995) and McMillan (1997).
25Note the perks are increasing in the size of the project. This could capture promotion
possibilities, community employment concerns, other political economy stories, or perhaps
more direct personal beneﬁts associated with controlling more assets. We could generalize
this speciﬁcation to allow perks to vary with the project’s output or proﬁt.
26We treat this as exogenous in this simple model. More realistically, one could imagine it at
least partially being determined within a bargaining game over the terms of the loan contract.
This capacity to negotiate such terms may only be partial as a consequence of directives from
higher level authorities.
27For simplicity, we collapse the entire principle-agent solution into this simple function.
13CL
2 = ∂CL
∂φL < 0. Lastly, we assume that CL
12 = ∂2CL
∂aF∂φL < 0. So, more able
leaders ﬁnd it less costly to induce eﬀort from their managers.28
If the ﬁrm is privatized, the manager will purchase the ﬁrm at price p and
become the residual claimant. The utility of the manager when he runs the ﬁrm
is UM, which can be expressed as
UM = P(aB,a F)(S − R)K − δM(1 − P(aB,a F))K − CM(aF,φM). (2)
Notice that the manager’s utility is the same as the leader’s except that there
are no perks for a private ﬁrm from getting a loan and that the penalty for
default is perhaps diﬀerent. We assume that the project chosen by the ﬁrm is
the same regardless of ownership.29 Naturally, we assume that the cost to the
leader of inducing a level of eﬀort aF must be at least as large as the cost of the
manager in providing it. This captures that one component of the leader’s cost
is a payment to the manager that guarantees the manager’s participation and
therefore must at least oﬀset the manager’s eﬀort costs.30
The bank’s (or equivalently, in this framework, the bank manager’s) utility
function consists of four components: the perks associated with lending to TEs,
the expected proﬁt or loss from lending, a penalty for illiquidity, and the cost
of monitoring eﬀort. This is given by
UB = γBK + βπ − IQ(P,F) − CB(aB,φB), (3)
where γB = αB if the ﬁrm is a TE, and γB = 0 if it is a privately owned
ﬁrm. The term αBK represents perks from loaning to a TE. There are many
28Although we could more explicitly model the nature of the agency relationship between
the leader and manager, this cost function captures the basic dynamics in a simple manner
without aﬀecting any of the results qualitatively. The important thing here is that the leader
must exert some eﬀort or bear some cost, i.e. monitoring or agency cost, not required in a
private ﬁrm.
29One could imagine a situation in which a manager may have superior information and
t h e r e f o r eb ea b l et op i c kah i g h e rp r o ﬁt project. Alternatively, an owner with less liability for
losses might choose a riskier project. We abstract from these dimensions.
30Of course, beyond participation, the payment must also induce the desired eﬀort level.
14beneﬁts to the bank manager and the bank, both private and political, from
maintaining close relationships with the leader and local government. We let β
represent the intensity of the bank manager’s proﬁt incentive as set by higher
level authorities, and π is the proﬁts from loaning to this ﬁrm. In a parallel
fashion to the eﬀort costs of the leader and manager, CB(aB,φB)i st h ec o s to f
bank monitoring, where CB
1 > 0, CB
11 > 0, CB
2 < 0, and CB
12 < 0. This eﬀort
on the part of the bank can be thought of as direct intervention into the ﬁrm’s
operation or into the monitoring of ﬁrm workers by the bank manager leading
to a higher probability of ﬁrm success.
If the bank becomes illiquid, it incurs a cost of I. This can be interpreted
in a variety of ways including as a personal cost to the manager associated with
their future career prospects; the costs of a bailout from higher-level authori-
ties; or the opportunity cost associated with having to forego future proﬁtable
investments due to insuﬃcient funds. The probability of the bank being illiquid
arises endogenously and is denoted Q(P,F). Here Q, or the probability of be-
coming illiquid, decreases in the success probability of this project, and possibly
decreases in a measure of loan portfolio diversiﬁcation F. We assume that F is
a decreasing function of loan size.31 To simplify the analysis, we assume Q is a
linear function of P,o rQ = A(K) − F(K)P.
4 Township Enterprises, Private Firms or Shut-
down
In the ﬁrst stage of the game, the leader makes a decision about ﬁrm ownership.
The leader compares the value of the government owned ﬁrm (UL)t ot h er e v e n u e
(p) associated with privatizing the ﬁrm, and sells the ﬁr mi fa n do n l yi ft h i s
31And we assume that F00(K) ≤ 0.
15revenue exceeds his valuation of the retained TE. At the same time, the manager
is willing to buy the ﬁrm if and only if the price he pays is less than the value
of the ﬁrm under his ownership, UM >p . Thus, a necessary condition for
privatization is that UL <U M.W ea s s u m et h ep r i c eo ft h eﬁrm to be privatized
is determined through Nash Bargaining. So, the transacting price is p =( 1+
λ)UM −λUL,w h e r eλ ∈ [0,1] represents the bargaining power of leader.32 This
implies that UL <U M is a suﬃcient condition for privatization. So, the leader
will allocate ownership to whoever values the ﬁrm most ex post.33 If no one
places a positive value on the ﬁrm, i.e. UL < 0a n dUM < 0, then the leader
will shutdown the ﬁrm in order to avoid losses.
In order to solve for this decision, we must ﬁrst consider the two subgames:
a government-owned ﬁrm and a private ﬁrm. First, we solve for the optimal
eﬀort choice by the leader or manager as a function of the bank’s decision. We
then solve for the bank’s monitoring decisions for both the government-owned
ﬁrm and the private ﬁrm. These eﬀort decisions yield the optimized leader’s
utility of a township-owned ﬁrm U∗
L, and the optimized manager’s utility of a
private ﬁrm U∗
M. As discussed, if U∗
M − U∗
L > 0, the leader will privatize. We
conduct comparative statics on this privatization decision in order to see what
increases the surplus (and therefore the likelihood) of privatization. If U∗
L < 0
and U∗
M < 0, the leader will shutdown the ﬁrm.
4.1 Within-Firm Decisions
There are two ﬁrm subgames: a township-owned ﬁrm and a private ﬁrm. In
either case, the owner has to select a level of managerial eﬀort ai
F where i = L,M
32T h es i z eo ft h i sp a r a m e t e rλ can reﬂect the competition amongst possible buyers, the
outside option of the manager, or unmodelled asymmetric information.
33Preliminary evidence on the improved performance of ﬁrms after privatization seems con-
sistent with this intuition.
16in the township-owned ﬁrm and the private ﬁrm, respectively. A ﬁrm owner




γFK + P(aB,a F)(S − R + δi)K − δiK − Ci(aF,φi), (4)
where γF = αL if the ﬁrm is a TE, and γF = 0 if it is a privately owned ﬁrm.
The solution equates the marginal beneﬁt of increasing the project’s probability
of success to the marginal cost of eﬀort.34
P2(aB,a F)(S − R + δi)K − Ci
1 =0 . (5)
This provides some insight into within-ﬁrm decisions. Focusing attention on
decisions in these subgames, we see the following:
Lemma 1: Fixing bank eﬀort, the ﬁrm manager’s eﬀort level
1. increases with his ability, the successful return of the project, the budget
hardness, and the size of the project;
2. does not vary in the perks the leader derives from a loan;
3. decreases with the interest rate.
All of these results are quite intuitive. The owner chooses a higher level of
managerial eﬀort when the cost of this eﬀort falls (high φi), the returns to eﬀort
rise (high S,l o wR,h i g hK), and the penalties for failure rise (high δi,h i g hK).
In addition, the eﬀort choice does not vary in the perk parameter. This is due
t ot h ef a c tt h a tw eh a v em o d e l e dp e r k si nav e r ys i m p l ew a ys ot h a tt h e yd o
not depend on the success of the project. If they were to be increasing in this
probability, increasing αL would increase the return to the leader’s eﬀort.
34The second order condition is P22(S−R+δi)K−Ci
11 < 0. Thus, we have a global interior
maximum.
17Lemma 2: Increased bank eﬀort induces an increase in the ﬁrm manager’s eﬀort
level.
When bank eﬀort increases, this increases the return to within-ﬁrm eﬀort
by the ﬁrm manager through the complementarity between bank and manager
eﬀort that is assumed in the probability of investment success.
Note that if a private ﬁrm does not have a much softer budget than the TE,
i.e. δM is not signiﬁcantly smaller than δL,t h a ti ti sa l w a y st h ec a s et h a ta
manager in a privately owned ﬁrm will choose a higher level of eﬀort than the
leader would have in the TE subgame. This follows from the fact that for all
aF the cost of that level of eﬀort to the manager is no larger than the cost of
inducing that level of eﬀort for the leader.
Lemma 3: If δM ≥ δL, a manager in a privately owned ﬁrm will have a higher
level of eﬀort than a ﬁrm manager in a township owned ﬁrm. So, aM
F >a L
F.
We assume that δM ≥ δL throughout the rest of the paper. In other words,
that a TE’s budget constraint is not harder than that of privately-owned ﬁrm.
4.2 The Bank
The bank makes a monitoring decision at the same time as the leader’s privati-








18where π = P(ai
B,a i
F)(R −δi)K − (1 − δi)K,a n dQ = A −F(K)P. This yields
the following ﬁrst order condition35
[β(R − δi)K + IF(K)]P1 − CB
1 =0 . (7)
We have the following insights into bank activities:
Lemma 4: Fixing the within-ﬁrm eﬀort choice, the bank manager’s eﬀort level
1. increases with his ability, the cost of illiquidity, the intensity of his proﬁt
incentive, the interest rate, and in the size of the project;
2. does not vary with a change in the percentage of perks the leader or the
bank manager derives from a loan, or a change in the successful return of
the project;
3. falls in the hardness of the ﬁrm’s budget.
The bank manager’s eﬀort increases with his ability since this makes eﬀort
less costly; increases in the cost of illiquidity since it increases the cost of project
failure; and increases in the intensity of his proﬁt incentive since it increases his
beneﬁt from success. His eﬀort falls in the softness of the ﬁrm’s budget since
this reduces the costliness of project failure. Fixing ﬁrm eﬀort, the bank’s payoﬀ
does not directly depend on the leader’s or the bank’s perks or the successful
return to the project.
The ambiguity with respect to the interest rate and the size of the project
arises from two countervailing eﬀects. A higher interest rate raises the beneﬁt
35The second order condition is
[β(R − δi)K + IF(K)]P11 − CB
11 < 0.
19to eﬀort and larger project size increases the cost of failure, thereby increasing
the return to eﬀort. Both of these factors increase the expected liquidity of the
bank, however, making eﬀort less necessary. As a result, bank eﬀort may rise
or fall with a change in the interest rate or project size.
4.3 Equilibrium Eﬀort Decisions
The second stage of this game has unique eﬀort choices by the ﬁrm and the
bank jointly solving the ﬁrst order conditions listed above.
Lemma 5: There is a unique equilibrium to the eﬀort choice subgame.
These equilibrium eﬀort choices vary in most of the parameters of the model
in relatively predictable ways.
Lemma 6: The equilibrium eﬀort levels within the ﬁrm and of the bank
1. increase with the bank manager’s ability, the ﬁrm manager or leader’s abil-
ity, the cost of illiquidity, the intensity of his proﬁt incentive, the successful
return of the project, and the size of the project;
2. do not vary with a change in the percentage of perks the leader or the
manager derives from a loan;
3. are ambiguous in the hardness of the private ﬁrm’s budget and the interest
rate.
Many of these parameters have the same eﬀect on the best response of the
ﬁrm owner and of the bank, which induces more eﬀort. The complementarity of
20their eﬀorts reinforces this eﬀect in equilibrium. The magnitude of these com-
parative statics is also larger when the ﬁrm (project size) is larger, the budgets
are harder, the bank is more proﬁt motivated, or more liquidity constrained.
All of these factors increase the willingness of agents to increase their eﬀorts in
response to changes in the environment.
The ambiguity in Lemma 6 arises from the conﬂicting incentives of the two
agents. For example, when the private ﬁrm’s budget is hardened, the private
ﬁrm wants to work harder since it is responsible for more of the ﬁrm’s potential
losses. Through eﬀort complementarity, this makes eﬀort more appealing to the
bank. However, the harder budget makes the bank directly responsible for fewer
losses, which causes them to want to reduce their eﬀort. The reduction in bank
eﬀo r ti m p l i e st h a te ﬀort is less appealing to the ﬁrm. As a result, eﬀort may
rise or fall. The same basic conﬂict arises when the interest rate changes. In the
case of both of these variables, however, the implied ambiguity is less likely, i.e.
we can more easily say eﬀorts will increase, if eﬀort has a bigger impact on the
ﬁrm owner’s and bank manager’s payoﬀs. In particular, if project size is larger,
proﬁt motives are stronger, illiquidity is more costly, and budgets are harder,
then eﬀorts are more likely to increase with a small change in either the rate of
interest or the level of hardness of the ﬁrm’s budget.
5S h u t d o w n
Shutdown is only an appealing option for a leader when the ﬁrm is unproﬁtable
if retained as a TE, U∗
L < 0, and the leader is unable to sell it to the manager for
a positive price, U∗
M < 0. Then, the leader can only avoid the losses associated
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F )(S − R + δL)K − δLK + αLK − CL(aL∗
F ,φL). (9)
The intuition for what makes shutdown more or less likely is relatively simple.
Shutdown is less likely when the ﬁrm has more value to either party. These
values are of course a function of ﬁrm and bank eﬀorts.
Proposition 1: Factors that make shutdown less likely:
• high leader perks, high bank human capital, intense bank concern about
proﬁts, increasing illiquidity costs, high leader human capital, high man-
ager human capital, high payoﬀ of a successful project, and large project
size;
Factors that have an ambiguous eﬀect:
• hardness of the ﬁrm’s budget, and high rate of interest.
The ﬁrm has more value to the township leader if the leader’s perks are
higher. Thus, higher leader perks make shutdown less likely. The possibility of
shutdown is also reduced by higher eﬀort levels of either ﬁrm or bank managers.
Since these eﬀort levels are unambiguously positively correlated with factors
such as higher bank human capital, bank concern about proﬁtability, etc., in-
creases in the latter also reduce the likelihood of the ﬁrm ceasing operations.
The ambiguity in the proposition arises from the fact that some of these
factors have two countervailing eﬀects on eﬀort. As noted above, however,
22eﬀorts are more likely to increase and therefore to increase the value of the ﬁrm
if eﬀort matters more. This implies that increases in these variables will likely
reduce the prospect of shutdown when projects are larger, proﬁt motives are
more powerful, illiquidity costs are higher, and budgets are harder.
6 Privatization Decision
The leader will privatize if and only if the surplus to privatization is positive,
U∗
M − U∗
L > 0. We deﬁne this diﬀerence as G, the gain from privatization. So,
the surplus to privatization is given by:
G = P(aM∗
B ,a M∗




F )(S − R + δL)K + δLK − αLK + CL(aL∗
F ,φL). (10)
Although the privatization decision is a discrete choice, i.e. the ﬁrm is either
privatized or not, we want to know what factors make privatization more or
less attractive. In other words, what factors increase the size of the surplus to
privatization.
Proposition 2: Factors that make privatization less appealing:
• high leader perks, and high leader human capital (or low outside options
for managers);
Factors that make privatization more appealing:
• high manager human capital;
Factors that have an ambiguous impact:
• the hardness of the ﬁrm’s budget, the bank’s concern about proﬁts, bank
human capital, rate of interest, size of the project, payoﬀ of a successful
project, and the penalty associated with illiquidity.
23Increasing leader perks or his human capital, or reducing outside options
for managers, increases the value of a retained ﬁrm without aﬀecting the value
of a privatized ﬁrm. Therefore, they are negatively related to the probability
of privatization. Similarly, since it is unrelated to the value of a TE, manager
human capital is positively related to the value of the private ﬁrm and therefore
to the probability of privatization.
Increasing the hardness of the ﬁrm’s budget can either increase or decrease its
value to its owner. This ambiguity arises since a harder budget has ambiguous
eﬀects on both ﬁrm and bank eﬀorts as discussed above. If eﬀorts increase
substantially, this can increase the value of the ﬁrm to its owner and oﬀset the
increased liability associated with the harder budget. However, if eﬀorts fall,
then the value of the ﬁrm will deﬁnitely fall. This decrease in value will make
the other ownership structure relatively more appealing.
Illiquidity costs, bank manager human capital and incentives, and project
size and payoﬀ are positively related to the value of the ﬁrm under either owner-
ship structure. Increasing any of these variables will lead to more privatization
only if they increase the value of the private ﬁrm more than they increase the
value of the township owned ﬁrm. The likelihood of this occurring depends on
the relative hardness of the budget of the private and TE ﬁrm. The intuition is
fairly straightforward.
Changes in parameters that induce either additional ﬁrm or bank eﬀort have
a larger impact on the value in a TE, where eﬀort is more costly and therefore
more scarce. As a consequence, on the margin, induced eﬀort increases the
value of a retained TE relative to a private ﬁrm. All else equal, this reduces the
likelihood of privatization. However, private ﬁrms are riskier endeavors since
they are responsible for more of their own losses, i.e. δM ≥ δL. In this way, the
24induced eﬀort can increase the expected proﬁt of the private ﬁrm by a larger
amount than the TE since it decreases the probability that these large losses
will be experienced. Essentially, if the budget of the private ﬁrm is much harder
than that of the TE, the relative value of the private ﬁrm can increase.36
We illustrate this point further by looking at the eﬀect of increasing the
bank’s proﬁt motive. This increase induces more bank eﬀort in the TE than
in the private ﬁrm, which increases the TE’s relative value. The eﬀect of bank
eﬀort, however, is weighted by the hardness of the budget. As long as the
hardness of the TE’s and the private ﬁrm’s budgets are similar, privatization is
less likely. If the private ﬁrm has a much harder budget constraint, however,
the eﬀect can go either way, and may lead to more privatization. In a related
way, the eﬀect of increasing the illiquidity penalty or the bank human capital
depends on budget hardness. Again, only if the private ﬁrm has a much harder
budget will this change increase the gains to privatization.
Am o r ep r o ﬁtable project (high S or equivalently low R)c a nb em o r eo r
less likely to be privatized. The ambiguity arises from two potentially oﬀsetting
eﬀects. Since a private ﬁrm realizes a proﬁt more often, a higher potential
proﬁt has a greater eﬀect on the value of the privately owned ﬁrm. This makes
privatization more likely. Project proﬁtability, however, also increases bank
eﬀort. Unless private ﬁrms have much harder budgets, the increase in bank
eﬀort will have a bigger eﬀect in TEs, which reduces the appeal of privatization
to leaders.
Lastly, increasing the size of the ﬁrm, K, has the same conﬂicting eﬀects as
increasing the project’s proﬁtability S. However, it also implies that the leader
receives more perks from retaining ownership, thereby lessening the incentive
36T h i sc a nb ee a s i l ys e e nb yc o m p a r i n gt h eﬁrm’s value under the two ownership structures
described by equations (1) and (2).
25to privatize.
7 Endogenizing Loan Size
In the previous analysis, we looked at how the value of the ﬁrm varies with ﬁrm
and bank eﬀort. More generally, the value of a ﬁrm depends on two things:
the size of the loan a ﬁrm can get ex ante,a n dt h ee ﬀorts exerted by the ﬁrm
and bank ex post. In this section, we focus on the bank’s ex ante decision with
respect to loan size. In other words, we endogenize the loan size K. Loan size
can be thought of as capturing the size of the ﬁrm, or the amount of operating
capital needed by the ﬁrm to implement some potentially proﬁtable project. We
allow loan size to be solely determined by bank decisions.37 Banks determine
their lending decisions by weighing the beneﬁts associated with project perks
and bank proﬁts against possible losses and liquidity costs.
To simplify, we ﬁx the bank and ﬁrm eﬀorts and focus solely on the bank’s
ex ante lending decision in order to ask the following two questions: (1) Given
the proﬁtability of each ownership type, will the bank lend relatively more to a
TE or private ﬁrm? (2) How does this lending decision aﬀect the privatization
decision?38 We focus on this simple case to illustrate the additional impact of
loan size. The bank’s utility in this case is
max
{K}
γBK + β[Pi(R − δi)K − (1 − δi)K] − CB − IQ(Pi,F(K)). (11)
Immediately, banks lend less when liquidity is a major concern. They loan more
37Within the context of our model, ﬁr m sa l w a y sp r e f e rt h em a x i m u ma m o u n to fc r e d i t .
This is a simpliﬁcation, but reﬂects the eﬀect of interest rates set below market-clearing levels
by the government.
38We can think of this as the bank making a lending decision conditional on the proﬁtability
of lending to ﬁrms of diﬀerent ownership. This simpliﬁcation amounts to assuming that the
loan size does not change the probability of the project’s success, P, and allows us to learn
how the bank’s lending decision is aﬀected by the ﬁrm’s proﬁtability, bank’s perks and changes
in liquidity constraints.
26to more proﬁtable ﬁrms, and all else equal, to TEs to enjoy relationship perks
γBK. This leads to the following results.
Privatization is more likely when the bank is more liquidity-constrained.
Increasing the bank’s liquidity constraint will decrease the loan size for both
ownership forms, but it will decrease that of a TE more on the margin because
TEs have larger loans to start with. This result is generated by our simple setup.
Fixing eﬀorts, the bank’s marginal utility is a constant, but its marginal cost (of
illiquidity) is an upward sloping and concave function of K. Because of the extra
perks a bank can enjoy from lending to a TE, the marginal beneﬁt of lending is
higher for a TE, and as a result, the loans are larger for a TE. Increasing the
liquidity constraint amounts to rotating the marginal cost curve up around the
origin, and this will decrease the optimal loan size for both ownerships. But it
decreases that of a TE more, because the marginal cost curve is ﬂatter at larger
loan size.
Since the loan size decreases more for a TE, the value of TE decreases more
than that of a private ﬁrm. This is compounded by the reduction in the leader’s
perks since loans to TEs are now smaller. So, privatization is more likely. By a
similar logic, privatization is also more likely when the punishment associated
with illiquidity increases.
When the bank has stronger incentives, and therefore cares more about
project proﬁtability, it will choose to loan relatively more to private ﬁrms since
they have a higher probability of project success. As a consequence, the value
of private ﬁrms will increase relative to TEs, implying that privatization is more
likely.
Privatization is also more likely when a bank manager enjoys fewer perks
from lending to TEs (a smaller γB).39 When it is diﬃcult for bank managers
39Note, as well, that this result is preserved with diﬀerent assumptions about the nature of
27to generate perks from maintaining a relationship with leaders, e.g. frequent
rotation of bank managers from posts or bank managers from outside the town-
ship, banks will be less willing to lend to TEs relative to private ﬁrms. Since a
ﬁrm’s value increases with the size of loan, a TE’s value will decrease with the
decrease in loan size, and privatization would thus be more likely.
The lack of ambiguity in these results may seem puzzling after the results
in section 6. Here, it derives directly from an assumption made in the setup.
In this section, we assume that ﬁrm eﬀorts are ﬁxed and are not responsive
to loan size. Relaxing this assumption will cause larger loans to induce more
eﬀort within private ﬁrms. In this way, loan size can have an additional beneﬁt
for banks — it can be an instrument to induce more within-ﬁrm eﬀort. Since
this eﬀort will be valued diﬀerently within ﬁrms depending on their ownership
structures, this can lead to the type of ambiguity discussed earlier. Here, since
our intention is merely to illustrate some aspects of bank actions that we have
not already discussed, we abstract from these eﬀects.
8D a t a
The data we use are the product of a collaborative survey eﬀort involving two
of the authors that was carried out in the summer of 1998 in 15 counties and 57
townships in the coastal provinces of Jiangsu and Zhejiang. The selection of the
counties and townships was designed to ensure a representative cross-section of
the region. After stratifying all of the counties in each province into three income
groups, we selected eight counties in each province.40 The counties are located in
ﬁve regions of the two provinces: Northern Jiangsu, Central Jiangsu, Southern
bank perks. In particular, the result obtains if bank perks are a function of TE proﬁtability.
40Administrative problems prevented the completion of the survey in one of the counties in
Z h e j i a n g ,t h u sg i v i n gu sd a t ao n1 5r a t h e rt h a n1 6c o u n t i e s .
28Jiangsu, Northern Zhejiang and Southern Zhejiang. Within each county, we
chose four townships also by stratifying on the basis of income.
The survey consisted of three parts: 1. a census of all ﬁrms that were
township-owned in 1993 in order to track ownership changes up through 1997;41
2. a survey of the local branch of the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC) and
the local Rural Credit Cooperative (RCC) that provided detailed information on
bank behavior, including balance sheet data; and 3. a survey of township leaders
that provided data on cadre personnel, the local government, and the township
economy. A majority of the townships in which we surveyed had branches of
both the ABC and a local RCC. These two institutions were the primary source
of the formal credit received by township-owned ﬁrms, and combined were the
source of more than three-quarters of all loans extended to either households or
ﬁrms in the townships.
Below, we describe the variables used in our empirical work. The variables
are organized into several groups: Privatization measures, ﬁrm characteristics,
bank attributes and incentives, attributes of local leaders, budget hardness, and
local market conditions. The one key variable we are missing is data on the
human capital of ﬁrm managers.
1. Privatization Measures: For all ﬁrms, we know any changes that oc-
curred in ownership structure and the year of the change. Our deﬁnition
of privatization coincides with the sale of a hundred percent of the ﬁrm
to either an individual or a group of individuals. This may occur through
either a single sale of the ﬁrm, or may occur after a township-owned ﬁrm
41As described in section 2.1, a supplementary survey in May 2000 provided information
on ownership changes for 1998 and 1999 for two-thirds of all ﬁrms. In the empirical work
reported in this version of the paper, we draw on the larger, but shorter data set. We do
this to maximize sample size. In general, the results for the smaller, but longer, data set are
similar, however, signiﬁcance levels are lower. This reﬂects the diﬃculty of explaining changes
in later years on the basis of information for 1994 or earlier.
29was initially converted into a shareholding company, in which the township
retained a share of the equity. In the latter case, the year of privatization
is the year in which the township sold oﬀ its remaining shares.
2. Firm Characteristics: For each ﬁr m ,w eh a v ea n n u a li n f o r m a t i o no n
proﬁts, employment, output and ﬁxed assets.
3. Budget Hardness: Hardness of the budget constraint of township-owned
ﬁrms in 1994 is self-reported by township leaders. They were asked to rank
how easy it was for them to persuade the banks to renegotiate loan terms
for township-owned ﬁrms. We do not have a comparable measure for
private ﬁrms, and so under the assumption that private ﬁrms faced hard
budget constraints, we use this as a relative measure of the hardness of
the budget for township-owned ﬁrms.
4. Bank Attributes: For each bank, we have personnel data on bank man-
agers, information on managerial incentives and bank objectives, and bank
liquidity.
(a) Personnel data on bank managers consists of their age, education,
and if they are from the township.
(b) For each bank, we know the weight given to proﬁtability in the evalu-
ation of bank managers, and the ratio of the bonus to base income for
the bank manager. These are typically set by a higher level banking
authority.
(c) Bank liquidity is measured using two variables: the percentage of
loans that were classiﬁed as non-performing42 in 1994, and deposit
growth over the period 1994-97.
42Up until 1997, non-performing loans were classiﬁed into three categories: overdue, inactive
and dead. We use some of these as our measure.
305. Attributes of Local Leaders: We know the age, tenure, and education
of the township cadre including the party secretary, the township head,
and the head of the township enterprise commission. Typically, the party
secretary is the most powerful, and we use information on their attributes.
6. Market Conditions: For each township, we know if a manager of a
township ﬁrm was lost to a private ﬁrm between 1990-1994. We use this
information to construct a county-level variable that reﬂects the percent-
age of townships in the county that lost a manager to outside opportuni-
ties. The county is a better unit of observation than the township because
markets for managers were not limited to the township they were currently
in.
Summary information for key variables is provided in Table 5. Unless we
note otherwise, information is reported for 1994, the ﬁrst year of privatization
activity that we examine. Especially important in our analysis are the diﬀer-
ences across localities in the ﬁnancial institutions, notably, in incentives and
bank liquidity. The weight assigned to proﬁtability by the bank branch among
its objectives is measured on an index from one to ﬁve, with ﬁve the highest.
The mean in our sample is 3.7, with a standard deviation of 0.8. Manager in-
centives, on the other hand, are captured by the ex ante ratio of the manager’s
bonus to total income if the branch fulﬁlled all of their targets. On average,
these bonuses were equal to two-thirds of total manager compensation, with a
standard deviation of a quarter. Bank liquidity is captured by the percentage
of self-reported non-performing loans and deposit growth. On average, banks
reported that 21.1 percent of their loan portfolio was non-performing, with the
breakdown between overdue, inactive and dead roughly 40, 35 and 25 percent,
respectively. Mean annual deposit growth in the ﬁnancial institutions over the
31three-year period between 1994 and 1997, on the other hand, was 26.9 percent,
with a standard deviation of 11.3. Finally, township leaders were asked to self-
report their ability to renegotiate loans that had been made by local ﬁnancial
institutions to township ﬁrms. Information from this question was used to con-
struct a categorical variable that equals one if leaders felt re-negotiation was
relatively unlikely. More than half reported that they were not able to renegoti-
ate. In addition, thirty percent of all townships reported losing a ﬁrm manager
to a private ﬁrm.
9 Empirical Results
We are interested in both the decision to privatize as well as the likelihood
that a collective ﬁrm ceases operation. We ﬁrst examine the decision to priva-
tize, ignoring the possibility that the collective ﬁrm may be shutdown. Next,
we analyze the choice between privatizing the ﬁrm, maintaining the ﬁrm as a
collective-owned ﬁrm, and shutting down the collective ﬁrm.
9.1 The Decision to Privatization
In order to analyze the likelihood of privatization, we draw largely on a simple
probit, supplemented with a hazard model. In the probit model, we estimate
the probability of a ﬁrm being privatized between 1994-1997, conditioning on
information for 1994. Although the probit model is simple and intuitive, it
has several drawbacks that might bias our results. First, it does not capture
diﬀerences in the timing of privatization. Empirically, we observe that some
ﬁrms were privatized earlier than others. Both the rate of privatization and the
results from the probit estimation might be sensitive to the ending date we use.
Second, the probit model does not deal with the censoring of the data, and so
we have nothing to say about ﬁrms that were privatized after 1997.
32The hazard model, on the other hand, captures the timing of the privatiza-
tion decision and deals with the censoring of the data. We estimate the Cox
Proportional Hazard Rate function: h(t)=h0(t)exp(X ∗ β), where h0(t)i st h e
baseline hazard (not estimated in this context), X is a matrix of independent
variables inﬂuencing privatization, and β is the vector of coeﬃcients to be es-
timated. The eﬀect of the kth variable in X, xk, on the relative hazard rate is
given by exp(βk). We report exp(βk)b e l o w . I fe x p ( βk) is greater (less) than
1, we say that the variable xk increases (decreases) the hazard of privatization.
The hazard model is estimated using maximum likelihood.
The results of our estimation are provided in Table 6 and 7. The number of
observations we use is considerably less than the sample size reported in Table 2
because of missing data for some key variables. We report results with (columns
3, 4 and 5) and without (columns 1 and 2) data on leader and bank manager
attributes. We also report separate estimates for versions of the model that
include interaction terms involving the hardness of the budget constraint with
bank incentives and bank manager attributes (columns 4 and 5). In general, the
results are very consistent between the two methods of estimation, and suggest
a similar interpretation. We organize our discussion around the groupings of
variables above.
Bank Attributes: Incentives of the bank, as measured by the weight given
to proﬁt in managerial evaluation, has a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on priva-
tization. The ratio of bonus to base income is also positive, but only signiﬁcant
in a few cases. These results suggest that in townships in which bank proﬁtabil-
ity and incentives are given more weight, ﬁrms are more likely to be privatized.
The likely avenue through which this is working is bank decisions with respect
to ﬁrm monitoring and lending. With more powerful incentives, the banks have
33incentive to do more of both in the case of private ﬁrms as long as their budgets
are harder. This will increase the value of a privatized ﬁrm relative to its col-
lective counterpart. In columns 4 and 5 of Table 6, we observe that the sign on
the interaction term between budget hardness and the weight on proﬁtability
in the bank branch is negative and signiﬁcant. (The interaction term involving
manager incentives is insigniﬁcant.) This is consistent with the model’s predic-
tion in that the eﬀect of more powerful incentives on privatization is dampened
in environments in which the budget constraints of the TEs are relatively hard.
Empirically, bank liquidity is also important for privatization. We ﬁnd that
increases in bank illiquidity, as captured by the ratio of non-performing loans
to the bank’s total loan portfolio, and lower deposit growth, both signiﬁcantly
increase the likelihood that the ﬁrm will be privatized. As in the case of bank
incentives, these eﬀects on the likelihood of privatization should be reduced
when the budget constraints of the TEs are hardened. In fact, we ﬁnd that
the interaction term involving non-performing loans and budget hardness is
negative and signiﬁcant. There are several interpretations for this behavior. On
the one hand, increases in bank illiquidity will lead to higher eﬀort levels by
bank managers. All else equal, this will contribute to an increase in ﬁrm value.
The eﬀect that this has on privatization, however, depends on the magnitude
of this increase and the complementary increase in eﬀort of the ﬁrm manager.
The fact that privatization seems more likely as illiquidity increases suggests
that the increase in bank eﬀort is having a larger overall eﬀect on private ﬁrm.
The negative sign on the interaction eﬀect implies that the eﬀect of illiquidity
on privatization is signiﬁcantly reduced when the township ﬁrms are more like
private ﬁrms, i.e. both face hard budgets. A complementary interpretation for
the positive correlation between bank illiquidity and privatization relates to the
34perks that leaders are able to extract from these ﬁrms. A leader’s perks are tied
to the size of K, or loan from the bank. All else equal, loans to TEs are larger
the more liquid the ﬁnancial institutions. This increases the relative valuation of
the ﬁrm under township ownership and reduces the likelihood of privatization.
A decline in bank liquidity (or an increase in illiquidity), on the other hand,
increases the prospect of privatization.
Finally, we ﬁnd that increases in the human capital of the bank manager, as
reﬂected in their education and age (experience) both signiﬁcantly increase the
likelihood of privatization. This is consistent with the model when the hardness
of budget constraints across ownership structures is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent. In-
creasing the human capital of the bank manager reduces the cost of bank eﬀort
and therefore induces more such eﬀort. Examining the sign on the interaction
eﬀects of human capital and budget hardness, we ﬁnd that increasing the hard-
ness of the budgets of township ﬁrms dampens this eﬀect, as predicted, but the
results are not statistically signiﬁcant.
Last, we ﬁnd that privatization is less likely in townships in which the bank
manager is from the same township. This may be picking up the relationship
between the bank and local leaders, and the perks/beneﬁts the bank manager
obtains from this relationship as compared to the direct pecuniary incentives of
the bank. The positive sign on the interaction term between this variable and
budget hardness suggests that the returns to this relationship are reduced when
budgets are hardened.
Firm: Theoretically, ﬁrm size, proﬁtability (actually, proﬁtability of the
project), and hardness of the budget constraint all have ambiguous eﬀects on
the likelihood of privatization. We experimented with several measures of ﬁrm
size including employment, ﬁxed assets, and output, and only report the results
35with employment. We ﬁnd that larger and more proﬁtable ﬁrms are much less
likely to be privatized. In addition, ﬁrms are more likely to be privatized when
budget constraints are harder.
Firm size and proﬁtability are both probably correlated with the various
private and public perks that the leader can take from the ﬁrm. The negative
signs on these variables can be taken to support the potential role of perks in the
decision-making process and the decision to retain larger and more proﬁtable
ﬁrms under township control.43 This ﬁnding is in sharp contrast to much of the
experience in Eastern Europe, where more proﬁtable ﬁrms were the ﬁrst to be
privatized.
Township Leader: Privatization should be less likely in townships in which
the township leader has better human capital. We ﬁnd some support for this
view with the likelihood of privatization negatively correlated with leader edu-
cation. The eﬀect of age is insigniﬁcant. We also ﬁnd that privatization is more
likely if the leader is from the local township. This is the opposite of what we
found in the case of bank managers. One interpretation for this ﬁnding is that
leaders who have been in the township longer may be able to beneﬁt indirectly
f r o mt h es a l eo ft h eﬁrm to someone they have a long-term relationship with.
Market Conditions:
We know if managers of township owned ﬁrms were lost to private ﬁrms
between 1990-1994, the period predating much of the privatization. We ﬁnd
that ﬁrms in areas where managers have better opportunities are more likely
to be privatized. Theoretically, these better opportunities for managers can be
thought of as mapping into an increased cost to the leader of inducing managerial
43The tendency for smaller ﬁrms to be privatized and larger ones to remain under collective
ownership is very similar to the zhua da fang xiao (hold on to the big, and let go of the small
ﬁrms) policy with respect to state-owned enterprises. Current policy with respect to the SOEs
appears to be to retain and support only the largest ﬁrms.
36eﬀort, i.e. higher compensation for the manager. This would reduce the value
of the ﬁrm to the government, and increase the likelihood of privatization.44
9.2 Privatization, Shutdown, and Remaining Township-
owned
In Table 8, we report results from a multinomial logit. We keep the analysis sim-
ple and use only a subset of the variables included in our empirical analysis of the
privatization decision. The variables include initial proﬁtability, employment,
the hardness of the budget constraint if the ﬁrm is collective, the incentives of
bank managers, the percentage of the loans of the local ﬁnancial institutions
that are non-performing, and the outside opportunities of ﬁrm managers. Be-
ing shutdown is the comparison group, and so the reported coeﬃcients reﬂect
the eﬀect of these variables on the likelihood of remaining collective or being
privatized relative to ceasing operations.
Several key ﬁndings emerge. First, bank incentives are important to the
prospect of being shutdown. Increased weight on proﬁtability and more power-
ful incentives for bank managers both signiﬁcantly reduce the likelihood of shut-
down relative to either remaining collective or being privatized. Indirectly, this
supports the important role that banks can play in inﬂuencing the value of the
ﬁrm through their lending and monitoring decisions. Second, non-performing
debt has a much larger impact on the likelihood that the ﬁrm is shutdown rela-
tive to remaining collective compared to the likelihood that the ﬁrm is shutdown
relative to being privatized. This suggests that bank liquidity and continued
lending is much more important to sustaining township ﬁrms than it is to pri-
vatized ﬁrms. And ﬁnally, larger ﬁrms, as measured by employment, are less
44This ﬁnding is consistent with conversations we had with local cadres in Zhejiang dating
back to 1995. Several township party secretary complained of the diﬃculty they were having
in retaining ﬁrm managers, and the eﬀect this was having on the values of township ﬁrms.
Selling oﬀ these ﬁrms seemed the only alternative.
37likely to be shutdown than be retained as collective ﬁrms, but ﬁrm size does not
seem to matter in the choice between being privatized and being shutdown.
10 Concluding Remarks
Government ownership confers a variety of private and social beneﬁts on govern-
ments and politicians. These beneﬁts, however, are not determined in isolation,
but rather depend on the interaction between governments, ﬁnancial institu-
tions, and enterprise managers. Starting from this basic premise, in this paper
we examine the decision of local governments to privatize ﬁrms. Our analy-
sis highlights how the incentives of governments to privatize are inﬂuenced by
the environments in which these ﬁrms operate, including bank incentives and
liquidity, budget hardness, monitoring costs, human capital, and outside op-
portunities of ﬁrm managers. These factors aﬀect the value of the ﬁrm under
alternative forms of ownership, and thus the returns to either privatizing the
ﬁrm, or retaining it under government ownership. Solid empirical support for
the model’s predictions is found drawing on behavior for a representative cross-
section of ﬁrms from the provinces of Jiangsu and Zhejiang. Since 1993, nearly
sixty percent of the ﬁrms in these provinces have been privatized.
Given the important role of ﬁnancial institutions in the privatization process,
in future work we plan to examine how these same institutions are inﬂuencing
the returns to privatization. In addition to being a potential source of selection
eﬀects, banks also inﬂuence ﬁrm performance through their willingness to lend
and their monitoring role. Discrimination against private ﬁrms has been a
prominent feature of China, and it remains to be seen how important this may
be in shaping the beneﬁts and returns to government divesture.
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P r o o fo fL e m m a1 :
Totally diﬀerentiating the ﬁrst order condition (Equation (5)) with respect to



































P r o o fo fL e m m a2 :








P r o o fo fL e m m a3 :




Since, at any ﬁrm manager eﬀort level aF, it is cheaper for the manager to exert
additional eﬀort than for the leader to induce the manager to exert the same
additional eﬀort, i.e., CM
1 (aF,φM) <C L
1 (aF,φL)a n dδM > δL, aM
F >a L
F by
the concavity of P.
P r o o fo fL e m m a4 :









11−A2P11 > 0, daB
dI = hP1
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11−A2P11 < 0, and daB
dγB = daB
dαL =
0, where A2 = β(R − δi)K + Ih).
P r o o fo fL e m m a5 :





the solutions aB and aF increase in each other. There must exist at least one












11−A2P11)2 > 0, since P112 < 0a n dP122 < 0.
Thus, aB is increasing and strictly concave in aF. Similarly, aF is increasing and
strictly concave in aB. Given the conditions on P(.)g u a r a n t e et h a ta∗
i(a−i) > 0




P r o o fo fL e m m a6 :















Note that ∆11 < 0, ∆22 < 0, ∆12 > 0a n d∆12 > 0. The determinant of ∆ is






Since P11P22 − P2
12 > 0, |∆| > 0.




|∆| > 0, daB
dI =
−hP1∆22
|∆| > 0, daB
dβ =
−(R−∆i)KP1∆22
|∆| > 0, daB
dS = KP2∆12








|∆| > 0, and daB
dγB = 0. The following are ambiguous: daB
dδi =
βKP1∆22+KP2∆12
|∆| ,a n ddaB
dR = −daB
dδi .
40P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1( S h u t d o w n ) :
Totalling diﬀerentiating U∗
i with respect to the exogenous variables and us-






















































P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2( P r i v a t i z a t i o n ) :
Totalling diﬀerentiating G with respect to the exogenous variables and using






























































































[1] Boycko, Maxim, Andrei Shleifer and Natalia Tsukanova, “Privatizing
Russia.” Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995.
[2] Byrd, William and Qingsong Lin, “China’s Rural Industry: Structure,
Development, and Reform.” Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990.
[3] Cao, Yuanzheng, Yingyi Qian, and Barry R. Weingast, “From Feder-
alism, Chinese Style, to Privatization, Chinese Style.” Economics of
Transition, 1999. 7(1), pp. 103-31
[4] Che, Jiahua, and Yingyi Qian, ”Insecure Property Rights and Gov-
ernment Ownership of Firms.” Quarterly Journal of Economics,M a y
1998, 113(2), pp. 467-96.
[5] Chen, Hongyi and Scott Rozelle, “Economic Reform, Institutional
Transition, and Firm Contractual Form Innovation: An Empirical
41Study on China’s Township and Village Enterprises.” Journal of De-
velopment Economics, December 1999, 60(2), pp. 529-57.
[6] Diamond, Douglas W., ”Liquidity, Banks, and Markets,” Journal of
Political Economy, 1997, 105(5).
[7] Jeﬀerson, Gary and Thomas Rawski, “Enterprise Reform in Chinese
Industry.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1994, 8(2): 47-70.
[8] McMillan, John, “Markets in Transition.” in David Kreps and Kenneth
Wallis, eds., Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and
Applications, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
[9] Megginson, William and Jeﬀry Netter, “From State to Market: A Sur-
vey of Empirical Studies on Privatization.” Journal of Economic Lit-
erature, 2001, 39(2): 321-389.
[10] Mian, Atif, “Creditor Incentives and Privatization,” mimeo, MIT, 2001.
[11] Oi, Jean, “Rural China Takes Oﬀ: Institutional Foundations of Eco-
nomic Reform,” University of California Press, Berkeley, 1999.
[12] Rajan, Raghuram, and Andrew Winton, ”Covenants and Collateral as
Incentives to Monitor,” The Journal of Finance, 1995, L(4), pp. 1113-
1146.
[13] Repullo, Rafael, and Javier Suarez, ”Monitoring, liquidation, and Se-
curity Design,” Review of Financial Studies, 1998, 11(1), pp. 163-187.
[14] Weitzman, Martin and Chenggang Xu, ”Chinese Township-Village En-
terprises as Vaguely Deﬁned Cooperatives.” Journal of Comparative
Economics, April 1994, 18(2), pp. 121-45.
42Table 1
Year Privatization Started and Completed (Number of Townships)
Year Privatization Completed
Start NA 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Total
1992 1 1 1 1 4
1993 2 2 1 5 1 11
1994 1 1417
1995 1 1 2 2 6
1996 1 4 1 9 15
1997 1 1 11 1 14
T o t a l s 6 21166 3 2 3 5 7
Notes: Based on township survey.Table 2
Privatization of Township Enterprises
Sample I: 1993-1997, 643 firms, 57 townships
Year Collective
Firms




1993 643 15 6 16 2.3
1994 628 28 7 30 1 4.6 4
1995 595 46 3 8 7.7 28
1996 521 57 4 13 10.9 26
1997 438 64 13 13 9 16.7 41
1998 324
Totals 210 33 80 10 34.2 99
Sample II: 1993-1999, 390 firms, 43 townships
Year Collective
Firms




1993 390 9 4 16 2.3
1994 381 17 7 30 1 4.7 2
1995 361 13 2 8 3.6 6
1996 342 36 3 7 10.5 13
1997 293 31 12 12 9 13.7 29
1998       224 37 3 4 14 21 32.1 7
1999       145 14 0324 1 3 . 8 1 1
2000       114
Totals 157 31 80 16 35 53.3 68
Notes: P1 represents the complete privatization of a collectively-owned township firm;
P2 (P3) represents the conversion of a collectively-owned firm to a shareholding
company in which the township has a majority (minority) share; P4 (P5) represents the
privatization of the township’s share in a shareholding company in which they were a
majority (minority) owner.Table 3
Privatization of Enterprises, by Province
Sample II, 1993-1999: Jiangsu
Year Collective
Firms




1993 220 0 3 7
1994 220 6 3 7 1 1
1995 212 1 0    0 0.5 4
1996 207 26 2 4 12.6 10
1997 171 15 11 5 9 8.8 20
1998 127 28 2 3 13 21 48.9 7
1999 58 7 0    2 0 4 19.0 10
2000 37
Totals 83 21 28 13 35 59.5 52
Sample II, 1993-1999: Zhejiang
Year Collective
Firms




1993 170 9 1 9 5.3
1994 161 11 4 23 1 7.5 1
1995 148 12 2 8 8.1 2
1996       134 10 1 3 7.7 3
1997 121 16 1 7 7 19.0 9
1998 89 91116 1 8 . 0 0
1999 73 70123 1 6 . 5 1
2000 60
Totals 74 10 52 3 17 55.3 12
Notes: P1 represents the complete privatization of a collectively-owned township firm;
P2 (P3) represents the conversion of a collectively-owned firm to a shareholding
company in which the township has a majority (minority) share; P4 (P5) represents the
privatization of the township’s share in a shareholding company in which they were a
majority (minority) owner.Table 4
Distribution of the Rate of Privatization at the Township Level











0-20 10 17.54 7 16.28
21-40 9 33.33 6 30.23
41-60 17 63.16 10 53.49
61-80 14 87.72 12 81.40
81-100 7 100.00 8 100.00
Total 57 43




     Employment 163.7
(400.1)
     Profits (10,000 RMB) 48.6
(391.2)
Bank Incentives
     Weight on Profitability, 1994 3.71
(.84)




     % Non-performing loans, 1994 21.1
(18.5)
     Deposit Growth, 1994-97 26.9
(11.2)
Township Government
     Hardness of Firm Budget Constraint
2 .56
(.50)
Note: 1. The manager’s bonus is measured relative to total compensation if all targets are
fulfilled. 2. A dummy variable coded equal to 1 if the township leader is not able to
renegotiate the terms of the loan.Table 6
Probit Regressions for Privatization
































Bank Incentives and Liquidity










































    Deposit growth -1.135
(-1.89)
Bank manager attributes






    Education*hardness -0.320
(-0.85)






    Age*hardness -0.021
(-0.30)






    Years living in the township*hardness 0.043
(1.20)
Township leader attributes






    Education*hardness 0.043
(0.11)






    Age*hardness -0.091
(-0.061)






    Years living in the township*hardness 0.891
(0.57)










Observations 347 263 347 344 347
Pseudo R-squared 0.193 0.196 0.256 0.300 0.288
Note: T-statistics are reported in parenthesis based on robust, cluster-corrected standards errors.Table 7





















Bank Incentives and Liquidity


















    Deposit growth 0.905
(-0.10)
Bank manager attributes
    Education 1.474
(1.74)
    Age 1.150
(2.56)
    Years living in the township 0.979
(-1.50)
Township leader attributes
    Education 0.831
(-2.00)
    Age 1.150
(2.56)
    Years living in the township 0.979
(-1.50)






Observations 347 254 347
Log-likelihood -641.3 -464.1 -628.4Table 8
Multinomial Probit Results
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Note: T-statistics are reported in parenthesis based on robust, cluster-corrected standards errors.DAVIDSON INSTITUTE WORKING PAPER SERIES - Most Recent Papers
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